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Runsrican Indian
Courlts End
TIribal
Eil-Doumrnuntn
American Indian courts are expressions
of Indian self-determination and should be
maintained and strengthened.

By Richard B. Collins, Ralph W. Johnson,
and Kathy Imig Perkins

A

RECENT article in this Journal by Samuel J. Brakel
(August, 1976, page 1002), "American Indian Tribal Courts: Separate? 'Yes' Equal? 'Probably Not,' "
contained a number of observations and conclusions
about American Indian courts. It offered no data, however, to support its conclusions; it contained important
factual errors; it attributed to Indian people, without
substantiation, negative attitudes toward the Indian
courts; and it contained derogatory and inaccurate
comments about the integrity and independence of the
Indian courts and the training available to their judges.
This article is intended to rebut several of Mr.
Brakel's key assertions and to emphasize the wellestablished right of Indians to maintain their own
courts. Each of the authors has had extensive contact
and experience working with Indian courts. Mr. Collins is associated with the Native American Rights
Fund. He formerly had many contacts with Indian
courts when he practiced law on the Navajo Indian
Reservation. Professor Johnson, who has taught law at
the University of Washington School of Law for
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twenty-one years, has for the past six years been an
instructor in the National American Indian Court
Judges Association's American Indian court judges
training program. Kathy Imig Perkins has been associated with the National American Indian Court
Judges Association since 1970, has participated in the
growth and development of the training program for
Indian court judges, and has witnessed the careful
development by these judges of a court system that can
form an integral part of the future of the American
Indian people.

Indian Courts in the Southwest
By Richard B. Collins

M Y EXPERIENCE with Indian tribal courts is largely
confined to Arizona and New Mexico, where I
practiced law on the Navajo Indian Reservation and
observed the Navajo, Hopi, Apache, and other tribal
courts. The tribes in Arizona and New Mexico include
about 63 per cent of the reservation Indian population
served by tribal courts. The Navajos alone are more
than 41 per cent of the national total.
The Brakel article's inaccuracies fall into several distinct categories: legal errors regarding the jurisdiction

of the tribes; factual errors regarding the nature of tribal
courts (at least as they exist in the Southwest); and false
and invidious comparisons to rural state courts based
on apparent lack of acquaintance with rural state
courts. The article then concludes with value judgments about tribal courts and Indian separatism that
are based on some wrong assumptions about the history of Indian affairs in this country. Since the last of
these is the most egregiously incorrect, I address it
first.
Indian tribal courts are only a part of the wellestablished legal and political institution of Indian
separatism, the right of reservation Indians "to make
their own laws and be ruled by them" (358 U.S. 217).
Mr. Brakel strongly suggests that Indians on reservations have not been consulted about the policy of Indian separatism, but this does not square with the facts.
United States policy supported Indian separatism until
about 1871, but since that time the government has
repeatedly forced on Indians the most exacting pressures to assimilate into Anglo-American society. All
variants of both carrot and stick have been tried on a
people reduced by conquest, disease, poverty, and
humiliation to a vulnerable state. While some Indians
succumbed, the great majority steadfastly have resisted a century of blandishments of the world's most
powerful government and have insisted on their right
to separatism.
For almost a century the abandonment of separatism
was clearly the easier path. Instead most Indians have
quietly but firmly maintained their separate waysoften at great personal cost. Few more decisive and
eloquent public opinion polls exist in the history of
human affairs.
The Indian tribal courts were established by the federal government and are Anglo institutions. They are
now mostly Indian run and are gradually being integrated into tribal life. But given the history of
government-Indian relations, discontent with tribal
courts is far more likely to be motivated by the belief
that they are not traditional enough rather than by a
preference for rural state courts. In my experience,
rural state courts are unpopular with Indians and for
good reasons.
Mr. Brakel says that tribal court jurisdiction "covers
and is final with respect to all civil and criminal matters occurring among Indians within reservation
boundaries, with the exception of thirteen major
crimes ..
" This statement is misleading both as to
coverage and finality. The authority of Indian tribes to
impose criminal penalties is limited by federal law to
petty misdemeanor ceilings-six months' imprisonment and $500 fine. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (7). Tribal court
criminal jurisdiction is thus severely circumscribed.
Punishment of serious crimes is complex. The fourteen major crimes (18 U.S.C. § 1153) are prosecuted in
federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 3242. (It is debatable whether
federal jurisdiction is theoretically exclusive of tribal
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jurisdiction, but as a prac-

tical matter it is.) So are all
general federal crimes.
other serious crimes in
which there is a nonIndian victim also are prosecuted in federal court
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1152. This leaves the so1
called victimless crimes,
Richard B. Collins
as to which the law is uncertain, although one reported case sustains federal
court jurisdiction to convict an Indian of violation of
state gambling laws on a reservation (181 F. 2d 873).
Tribal court convictions resulting in a jail sentence are
no more final than state ones, since habeas corpus
review is available as a matter of right in federal courts.
25 U.S.C. § 1303.
Mr. Brakel states that "the tribal courts often cede to
state jurisdiction." This statement is factually wrong in
the Southwest and is legally questionable in light of a
decision of the United States Supreme Court forbidding these cessions by tribal courts (400 U.S. 421).
Mr. Brakel writes that criminal activity "is rampant
on most reservations," with reference to assault and
other misdemeanors. We are not told what Mr. Brakel's
standard of "rampant" is. No doubt reservation crime
rates are high compared with affluent suburbs and
prosperous farm country towns. But this is not a fair or
meaningful comparison. Indians were left with the
poorest land unwanted by white settlers and with shattered economies, and their communities are statistically the nation's poorest. Crime rates are typically
high in poor communities, although comparatively,
Indian reservations are low in crime compared with
city slums and other areas of high unemployment.
Violence exists but is far less than in Detroit or Newark.
Mr. Brakel says that civil cases in tribal courts are
rare. I have no statistics, but the Navajo courts handle a
large domestic relations caseload and a fair number of
minor tort and debt cases. Of course, reservation areas
are poor and underdeveloped, so that sophisticated
commercial and financial cases do not arise. He says
that English is the dominant language in tribal court
affairs, except in the Southwest-that is, except where
63 per cent of the Indians served by tribal courts live. In
the Navajo courts about 80 per cent of the proceedings
are in the Navajo language-a lovely tongue with a
proud oratorical tradition. For many adult Navajos this
is an extremely important advantage over state courts,
since they speak little English, and translators in
border-town state courts are very poor or lacking. The
Navajo courts go to much greater lengths to provide
translation when appropriate, and since judges and
most practitioners in the courts are bilingual, accuracy
is assured.
Mr. Brakel's most incredible statement about Indian
tribal courts is: "On the whole, tribal judges tend to be
T

810 American Bar Association Journal

more 'Anglo-American' than white judges whom the
Indian judges by and large seek to emulate." This is the
sort of absurd comment that impeaches itself better
than any critic could. Southwestern Indian judges are
mostly raised in the language and traditions of their
people. Their role as judge is alien to their traditions in
some ways, and they do outwardly imitate white
courts. But the inner values of a lifetime are hardly so
easily cast aside. These manifest themselves in subtle
ways-greater humility, greater consciousness of family and traditional relationships, and a recognition of
the marital and other social customs of the people.
Younger judges may be less traditional, but only in
degree.
Indian Tribal Courts Do Have Problems
I do not intend to suggest that all is well with Indian
tribal courts. Serious problems exist, some of which
Mr. Brakel identifies. Many are traceable to lack of
money and many to outside pressures to force the
tribes into an Anglo-American mold-a good example
is Mr. Brakel's own unquestioning assumption that
separation of powers is an inherent good. But Indian
tribal courts certainly function more sensibly, fairly,
and practically than the article would suggest.
The Brakel article contains explicit and implicit
comparisons with the rural state courts that would
serve Indian reservations in the absence of tribal selfgovernment. Since most tribal jurisdiction is over
domestic relations, misdemeanors, and minor torts in a
rural setting, the relevant comparison should be with
rural state justice of the peace level courts.
Mr. Brakel clearly believes tribal courts to be inferior
to these state courts, as the title of his article states. In
my view he is not well acquainted with rural state
courts of this level.
Mr. Brakel decries the level of education of tribal
judges (ignoring, of course, the oral tradition education of Indian judges). However, in New Mexico and
Arizona a J.P. level judge need have only a high school
education. And the Supreme Court of the United States
has upheld the utilization by state court systems of
nonlawyer judges (427 U.S. 328).
Mr. Brakel also criticizes the sharing of quarters by
tribal police and courts, pointing out (quite correctly)
that this does not improve the public's image of a
judge's impartiality. But he fails to observe that this
same sharing is common all over the United States,
even in cities. It is unfortunately true that Indians have
imitated this practice, but that does not differentiate
their courts from ours.
In several ways Mr. Brakel criticizes the lack of independence and impartiality of tribal courts, and this is
indeed a problem in many places. But it is certainly one
shared by rural state courts, which typically are close
to local land-owning and business interests. And the
race issue is treated too lightly by Mr. Brakel. While our
most notorious cases have arisen in the trials of black

people in the South, Indians have fared little better in
state courts. The United States Supreme Court once
sustained federal protection of Indians from state
jurisdiction observing: "Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the states where [Indians] are found are
often their deadliest enemies" (118 U.S. 375). While
matters are not so today, neither has racial prejudice
ceased
be important.
If theto
choice were mine, I would choose Indian tribal
courts over existing rural state alternatives as more
suitable, more economical, and more just for the Indian
communities they serve. But the choice is not up to me
or Mr. Brakel. It is the law of the land that the Indians
decide for themselves. They have opted determinedly
for separation so far, a choice they are free to reverse if
they wish. A study of the facts concerning tribal courts
would be welcome, but one laced with manifest destiny value judgments should not be sponsored.

The Northwest Experience
By Ralph W. Johnson and Kathy Imig Perkins
NDIAN TRIBAL courts throughout the United
States are in a dynamic stage of growth, both in
numbers and importance. Events contributing to this
phenomenon are that the federal courts have held (1)
that Indian courts have jurisdiction over non-Indians
for offenses committed on the reservation, (2) that Indians can regulate their own fishing activities-and
oust state regulation-if they have competent Indian

courts, policemen, jails, and the like, (3) that the 1953
federal law authorizing states to assume jurisdiction
over certain Indian lands is to be construed very narrowly, (4) that due process is not denied merely because a judge is not a lawyer, and (5) that many civil
and criminal issues arising on Indian reservations are
exclusively under Indian court jurisdiction.
These events have combined with the rising expectations of Indian people about the role of their courts in
conflict resolution, resulting in the renovation of several moribund Indian courts and the establishment of
many new ones. In addition, Indian courts have begun
to exercise their powers of review over administrative
decisions of tribal governments.
In 1970, in response to these new demands, the Indian judges created the National American Indian
Court Judges Association, whose principal goal has
been to organize an increasingly sophisticated and
demanding continuing judicial education program for
Indian court judges throughout the country. This organization has also launched a campaign to achieve
greater separation of powers between the judicial and
executive branches of Indian governments.

\
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worked out agreements with state officials and courts
to have domestic relations and juvenile matters referred to the Indian courts for disposition, under the
mutual understanding that the Indian court can do this
in a way that is more satisfactory to the Indian people.
It is noteworthy that in the past two years the New
Mexico and Washington supreme courts have held that
tribal laws are entitled to full faith and credit the same
as laws of "sister states" (533 P. 2d 751 and 555 P. 2d
1334).

Mr. Brakel's assertion that Indian tribal codes are
"typically ...
Kathy Imig Perkins

Ralph W. Johnson

Mr. Brakel's article contains many negative and unsubstantiated conclusions about individual Indian attitudes toward Indian courts. Certainly American Indian people realize that their courts are not perfect, but
the courts generally do have the support of the Indian
communities in which they operate. There exists,
among the Indian people in the Northwest and
elsewhere, a strong desire to improve these Indian
courts rather than to abdicate their judicial jurisdiction
to state or federal courts.
Mr. Brakel erroneously states that Indian people living in the Pacific states "even if living on 'reservations'
or otherwise designated Indian land holdings are, with
a few exceptions, subject to state court jurisdiction."
The legacy of Public Law 83-280 in the Pacific
states-Washington and Oregon in particular-is
much more complex than that. It is more accurate to
state that acts committed on Indian reservations are
generally not subject to state jurisdiction with certain
exceptions.
Tribes Have Revamped Their Codes
In Washington, for example, some nine (of twentythree) reservations are subject to substantial state
jurisdiction at their request, although most of these
have now requested return of this jurisdiction to their
own tribal courts. The other fourteen reservations are
not subject to state jurisdiction except for domestic
relations, child welfare, mental competency, and automobile travel on public highways. Most of these fourteen tribes also have requested that even this modest
element of state jurisdiction be returned to their own
tribal courts.
Other criminal and civil matters are handled by Indian courts, including jurisdiction over non-Indians
for acts committed within reservation boundaries, subject, of course, to the limitation of six months' imprisonment and a $500 fine imposed by the 1968 Indian
Civil Rights Act.
Mr. Brakel claims that Indian courts often cede probate, juvenile, and related jurisdiction to the states. In
fact, exactly the opposite is true. The Quinaults, the
Makahs, and other tribes in this region gradually have
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updated versions of the old B.I.A.

codes" is no longer true. Most Indian tribes in the past
ten years have completely revamped their codes.
Others are in the process of doing so with the assistance of legal experts, both Indian and non-Indian. The
implication that the use of non-Indian legal expertise
in the revision of these codes somehow renders them
"unquestionably Anglo-American" and therefore
non-Indian is incorrect. We are not sure what standard
Mr. Brakel used to determine the degree of "Indianness" of the tribal codes he examined.
Indians do live in the twentieth century and are
required by federal law to conform in substantial respects to non-Indian legal procedures and are subject
to the influence of the American legal system. It is
understandable that their codes would not appear as
they might have if the white man had never visited
their shores. Although B.I.A. lawyers did, in earlier
times, tend to copy their own models for tribal codes,
that practice is seldom seen today. The lawyers who
prepare these codes now do so under the direction of
increasingly sophisticated tribal leaders. The codes are
normally reviewed in depth at several stages of drafting by appropriate tribal members. It is distorting the
reality of the attorney-client relationship to imply that
the work product is non-Indian because the tribe hires
a non-Indian lawyer to draft it.
The Brakel article also makes these assertions which
are invalid or misleading:
1. Indian court judges are "not infrequently
...picked from the ranks of the tribal police." This is
simply false. In addition, it is misleading to say that "at
times they appear to be selected precisely because they
are politically weak." One needs only to make acquaintances among the Indian judges in the Northwestern
states to realize the inaccuracy of such a statement. It is
no doubt true that one criterion for selection of an
Indian judge by a tribal council-as with presidential
and gubernatorial appointments of federal and state
judges-is their philosophical compatibility with the
political leadership of the tribe.
2. "

...

[P]leading guilty is a traditional Indian re-

sponse to being accused and placed before a court."
Mr. Brakel seems to think that this response is different
from that in non-Indian courts where well over 90 per
cent of defendants brought before municipal and state
courts plead guilty, particularly to misdemeanors.

3. "On the whole, tribal judges tend to be more
'Anglo-American' than white judges." We have seen
absolutely no evidence to support such a conclusion in
our years of extensive dealing with Indian courts.
While it is true that Indian court judges are not "radical" in the sense that American Indian Movement
members are sometimes perceived, nonetheless these
judges take great pride in their Indian heritage and
consistently reflect concern about the protection of
Indian cultural values in their judicial activities.
4. There are now 127 Indian tribes, rather than the 60
Mr. Brakel cites (in 1970 there were 85), all recognized
by the federal government as having responsibility for
the establishment and operation of court systems
within their reservation governments.
The fact that the number of Indian courts has been
increasing rapidly indicates support by the Indian
people of an independent Indian court system. The
federal retrocession procedure requires the approval
by ballot of a majority of the Indian reservation adult
population. In 1975 sixteen tribes in Nevada completed this procedure and have now established Indian
courts. In Washington, although eleven tribes originally requested state jurisdiction under Public Law
83-280, two tribes have now obtained a return of that
jurisdiction, and eight others have attempted to obtain
retrocession, which has been denied because of the
uncertainty of state laws on the subject. The tribes in
the Pacific Northwest are generally upgrading their
court systems to exercise as much jurisdiction as possible under relevant state and federal laws.
An important aspect of this growth in the number of
Indian courts has been the development of a continuing judicial education program by the National American Indian Court Judges Association, a program which
Mr. Brakel passes off lightly as lacking "direction" and
"relevance."
Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, this training program has carried forward
a carefully planned series of regional seminars, meeting periodically some sixteen days a year for study,
lectures, and discussion on trial procedures, civil
rights, evidence, and other topics. The number of participating judges has grown from 42 in 1970, representing 85 tribal courts, to 200 judges in 1976 representing
118 Indian courts. The seminars are taught by lawyers,
judges, and law professors and have resulted in an
extensive set of teaching materials, including a recent
476-page casebook, Cases and Materials for Indian
Court Judges, as well as other publications of value to
Indian courts, such as Benchbook, Model Indian Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a book on Child Welfare
and Family law, and a Court Clerk's Handbook.
One aspect of the Brakel article continues to puzzle
us. We have spoken with (1) all of the tribal judges in
the Pacific Northwest, (2) most of the judges from reservations throughout the western United States, (3) the
fourteen members of the board of directors and steering

committees of the N.A.I.C.J.A., representing tribes
from all over the western United States, and (4) the staff
of the N.A.I.C.J.A. in Washington, D. C. None of these
was contacted by Mr. Brakel or anyone identifying
themselves as working with an American Bar Foundation study. None is aware of the sources of data that he
purports to rely on for the conclusions he draws about
Indian courts, their jurisdiction, operation, acceptance
by tribal members, or the effectiveness of their training
programs. All have major disagreements with his conclusions.
In view of the fact that all or nearly all of these juidges
are elected either by their tribal councils or in popular
elections by their tribal members, and thus represent a
very large body of Indian opinion, it seems inappropriate that Mr. Brakel should have ignored their views
so completely.
Much more could be said about the revival of spirit
among Indian peoples that has characterized the past
twenty-year movement away from termination and
toward self-determination. A flood of data from multiple sources, including Indian people, Indian courts,
federal agencies, federal and state courts, and social
and health service agencies, demonstrates overwhelmingly that Indian courts play a vital role in Indian life
and will play an even more vital role in the future. A

Mr. Brakel Responds:

Q NE OF THE major criticisms of my piece in the
rebuttal is that it failed to substantiate all its conclusions. The simple reason is that the American Bar
Association Journal format precludes this. With the
appearance of this rebuttal, I have an opportunity to
present some of the substantiating information. The
full story is in a detailed report not yet published.
The authors take pains to make us aware of their
various associations and experiences with the National
American Indian Court Judges Association and the
Native American Rights Fund, while adding that, by
contrast, many prominent people in these organizations had not heard of me. I would have regarded
association with N.A.I.C.J.A. and N.A.R.F. as more
troublesome than reassuring from the point of view of
objectivity, since these organizations have a clear stake
in supporting tribal separatism and promoting favorable accounts of tribal court operations. Responsible
research on tribal courts hardly requires being on familiar terms with all the politicians or administrators
of the "big" organizations, any more than gaining insight into the performance of American lawyers would
be helped much by cultivating the personal acquaintance of top American Bar Association personnel.
During the course of my study, however, I had personal contacts, in some cases extensive, with Judges
Kirk (Navajo) and Upchego (Uintah and Ouray) of the
N.A.I.C.J.A., president and member of the board of
directors respectively; Mr. Colosimo of Arrow, Inc.,
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major consultant to N.A.I.C.J.A.; Mr. Taylor and Ms.
Ayer, directors of the Indian Civil Rights Task Force
(Department of Justice); Messrs. Parker (ChippewaCree) and Trudell (Santee Sioux) of the American Indian Lawyers Association and several other Indian
groups; plus correspondence with a substantial
number of the numerous other organizations and associations that concern themselves with Indian issues
and problems.
More relevant, the findings reported in my article
were based on extensive firsthand study of the tribal
courts as well as the rural state courts. I did observations and interviews in the courts of the Devils Lake
Sioux (Fort Totten) Reservation, North Dakota; Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, North and South Dakota;
Blackfeet Reservation, Montana; Uintah and Ouray
Reservation, Utah; and the Navajo Reservation, New
Mexico and Arizona. No study can cover all reservations, and no "sample" will ever be fully satisfactory,
but the above presents a good mix in terms of activity
and size, and reputed "sophistication."
I visited state courts (including justice of the peace
courts] in areas immediately surrounding these reservations. And I examined several reservations under
state court jurisdiction: the (Eastern) Cherokee Reservation in North Carolina; the White Earth and Leech
Lake Reservations in Minnesota; and the Pawnee, Osage, (Western) Cherokee and Creek Indian "concentrations" in reservationless Oklahoma. I also have been
involved in extensive study of rural (state) justice in
unrelated projects-diversion in criminal cases and
legal services for the poor.
Indian Courts Play a Vital Role
1. While no one would deny or disparage the strong
resistance to total absorption into the dominant society
displayed by the Indian people, the question of
whether the new brand of separatism is either desired
or desirable is a different matter. It is not irrelevant that
more than half the people in this country who identify
themselves as Indians live integrated lives off the reservations. Even many of those on the reservations
spend at one or various points in their lives significant
time in off-reservation society. More precisely to the
point is the empirical fact that reservation Indians are
extremely skeptical of their tribal governments and
institutions, including the tribal courts. This skepticism is based on their experience with these institutions. True enough, many reservation people also distrust white institutions. But it is my view that the
growth of a federally dependent separatism generally
and the expansion of tribal court jurisdiction specifically are in the long run futile and that it would be
better and more realistic for the Indians to learn to trust
and live with integrated institutions.
2. The criticism of my description of the coverage
and finality of tribal court jurisdiction is difficult to
understand. Mr. Collins himself asserts that "tribal
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court convictions ... are no more final than state

ones." I consider that final enough to merit the term. As
for coverage, Iam well aware that criminal penalties in
the tribal court cannot exceed six months' imprisonment and a $500 fine. That does not mean jurisdiction
is limited to "petty misdemeanors," however, as Mr.
Collins insists. In theory, the courts could handle murder cases within these limitations. In practice, of
course, they do not-the Major Crimes Act and the
desire for more serious penalties in major crimes take
care of that. But many tribal courts do not handle a
great deal more than just petty misdemeanors. And the
important fact to note is that, in view of the minimal
role played by the federal courts in individual cases on
the reservations, the tribal courts are very significant
institutions on the reservations. To quote Professor
Johnson: "[the] Indian courts play a vital role in Indian
life .. " It is precisely for that reason that their inadequacy is an important matter.
The fuss over whether the tribal courts "cede" or do
not cede certain matters to state courts is also spurious.
The facts from my research experience were that the
Uintah and Ouray tribe's juvenile cases were handled
in the Utah state courts and that jurisdiction in domestic cases was not exercised by either the Standing Rock
or the Devils Lake court. Professor Johnson's own description of the various amounts of jurisdiction exercised and not exercised by the tribal courts in
Washington make the same point. If the big stumbling
block is the word "cede," I have no objection to Mr.
Collins's substituting the words "leave to," or "not
assumed," or "not reassumed."
3. Criminal problems unfortunately are "rampant"
on the reservations. Arrest rates range from five to
thirty times the national average. There are many factors to explain (or "excuse") this fact, some of which
Mr. Collins notes, but they do not contradict it. That
crime rates are also horrendous in the inner city of
Detroit or Newark is small cause for comfort. I would
not want to wish these rates on any society.
4. Civil cases in the Navajo courts comprise about 5
per cent of the total caseload (in part this reflects the
unusually high criminal caseload). Civil cases are even
more sporadic in most other tribal courts. In rural state
courts the criminal-civil ratio is more like fifty-fifty.
5. English remains the dominant language in tribal
court affairs, even if-as I pointed out-native languages predominate in courts in the Southwest. That
the Navajo comprise a large percentage of the total
reservation population in this country is less relevant
to my discussion than the fact that they are only one
reservation, one court, among many. Statements about
the Navajo language being "a lovely tongue" and so on
are only patronizing. In an environment in which artificial separations have ceased to be, translators should
be neither very necessary nor hard to come by, assuming for the sake of argument that this is a real problem
in border towns surrounding the Navajo Reservation.

6. That Indian judges, including Southwestern ones,
as Mr. Collins concedes, "do outwardly imitate white
courts" is the relevant fact. The operations and decisions are what count. Whether Mr. Collins's assumptions about the judges' inner life are valid, I cannot say.
I have my doubts in view of the fact that these "inner
values" are so readily cast aside on the operational
level.
7. Tribal courts are far more significant institutions
in reservation society than justice of the peace courts
are in off-reservation areas. Still, I have looked at J.P.
court operations, as well as rural county and district
courts. My conclusion that the tribal courts are "probably not equal" stems from comparison with all three
types of white courts.
8. Educational levels are a problem among Indian
judges whether or not New Mexico or Arizona requires
much education for J.P.'s. Education is a valuable asset for judges in Indian as well as white courts. More
generally, I am disturbed by the constant refrain that
because there are deficiencies in some segments of
white society and institutions-educational shortcomings, high crime rates, high guilty plea rates, political
interference in nonpolitical institutions, and so
forth-this somehow makes similar deficiencies in Indian society and institutions less of a problem.
9. The tribal codes of four of the six tribes that I have
seen were, as I stated, little more than "updated versions of the old B.I.A. codes." The Navajo code was one
of the substantially revamped and expanded jobs to
which Professor Johnson refers. The Navajo code was
very much an Anglo-American document, however,
not necessarily because it was put together by white
lawyers, but because its provisions read just like state
statutes. Professor Johnson's "explanation" that Indians today have little choice but to live under
Anglo-American-like laws in a twentieth century
Anglo-American-dominated environment is just my
point.
10. The prior police experience of a number of Indian
judges was pointed out to me by the judges themselves,
in particular by Chief Justice Kirk of the Navajo tribe,
who has a police background.
11. The lack of political independence of tribal court
judges, disputed by Professor Johnson or dismissed as
nothing more than "philosophical compatibility," is a
salient fact and serious problem, as is acknowledged
explicitly by Mr. Collins.
12. That "pleading guilty is a traditional Indian response" was a point of view pushed upon me by the
tribal judges themselves and by some "Indian experts." I have some doubts that the "tradition" argument is a valid explanation today, certainly not a full
one. That guilty plea rates are high in non-Indian
courts provides little comfort. High guilty plea rates
may be less than desirable no matter where they occur.
In white courts, moreover, they are generally the end
result of a bargaining and fact-finding process, which

is not the case in tribal courts, where they generally are
made unadvised and unconsidered. Guilty plea rates
in misdemeanors in rural state courts and in felonies in
all state courts are far lower than the 90 per cent plus
figure that Professor Johnson cites for municipal
courts. Finally, neither the pressures nor inducements
toward pleading guilty that exist in some state or
municipal courts apply generally to the tribal courts.
13. The number of tribal courts one counts depends
heavily on how one defines tribes and courts and
which sources one consults. The figure of 60 I used
included the major ones and was pieced together from
sources such as the Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate (Eighty-seventh Congress, first session 1961-65); James R. Kerr, "Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the American Indian," 18 Journal of Public Law 311 (1969); and Note,
"The Indian: The Forgotten American," 81 Harvard
Law Review 1819 (1968). Professor Johnson's count of
127 (up from 118 on his first draft, showing the elusiveness of the numbers) must include a good number
of courts of very limited jurisdiction from very small
bands or tribes. If his description of the varying and
often minimal degrees of jurisdiction among the 23
"reservations" in Washington is accurate, that would
go a long way toward explaining disparities between
my and his count of the number of "tribal courts."
Another fact is that the number of reservation courts of
one sort or another has increased since 1975 when my
article was submitted to theAmerican Bar Association
Journal.
14. My evaluation of the judicial education program
run by the N.A.I.C.J.A. was based on personal attendance at a two-day session in Denver, talking with the
judges and a few instructors about it, plus perusal of
each manual of the "extensive set of teaching materials" cited by Professor Johnson. It is also based on my
perception of the difficulty of successfully training as
judges a group of people of limited formal education,
among whom there is much discontinuity, resulting in
the aggregate in a low level of practical experience to
compound the deficient educational experience.
I will not bother with any other smaller points. I am
no advocate of total melting-pot assimilation, nor do I
entertain any of the "manifest destiny" notions with
which the rebuttal charges me, My qualms about tribal
courts and my reservations about Indian separatism
stem solely from observation and experience. In addition, I see the integrated experience as the only promising and realistic long-term prospect for the Indian
people in this country.
That does not mean I would deny their right to distinctiveness in many aspects of daily life or culture,
either now or in the long run. It does mean that I would
not want to be an accomplice in the perpetuation and
expansion of an artificial and federally dependent
separatism. A
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